Scenario 2/4
This illustrative scenario describes options for digital inclusion to prevent, mitigate, and resolve electoral violence. After decades of contested elections that have at times seen violent protests, a set of controversial reforms has led to the increasing political mobilization of the population along ethnic lines. Therefore, the major political opposition party boycotts the elections. Following the elections, the governing party declares its victory. However, large-scale violent protests break out, accompanied by country-wide skirmishes among various groups. In this context, the political opposition calls for the resignation of the government and a constitutional reform process. The parties eventually agree to negotiate with the support of an international mediator.
Phase 1
The run-up of the elections sees provocations across party lines involving limited violence, for instance, during demonstrations or in the form of campaigns to boycott the elections. Politicians, political groups, or extremist movements may use media and social media for spreading rumors and ethnic scapegoating. Government or political parties may also sponsor violence. Incumbent leaders and ruling party members may employ or threaten violence against the political opposition or potential voters before, during, or after elections. At this stage, violence can also result from grievances related to controversial or failed political reform processes, such as policies related to the re-drawing of electoral boundaries, which emphasize political divisions along ethnic lines.
Phase 2
Following the elections, results will be contested, most likely by the losing party. More than one candidate or party may claim victory, and there may be allegations of electoral fraud. In the context of the contested elections, different forms of violence may break out. Spontaneous and disorganized protests can turn violent as a consequence of police or army crackdowns. Opposition politicians may be threatened, arrested or physically assaulted. Such acts may provoke more protests and more violence. In addition, organized militias may form and organize attacks against members of the other ethnic group. Civil society organizations will call for an end to violence, a peaceful resolution of the conflict, or to bring in a mediator. Third parties such as foreign governments may also call for an end to violence and increase the political pressure on the conflict parties, including through visits to the country. At the end of the phase, the leaders of the conflicting parties will eventually agree on negotiating a peaceful solution to the crisis.
Phase 3
The negotiations between the contending parties begin. This process is likely mediated by a third party, such as the head of a foreign government, an international organization, or an eminent poltical person. The negotiations are likely to start in an exclusive and possibly informal manner, with limited options for participation of other groups. Often, inclusion will increase incrementally. The negotiations will lead to a deal between the representatives of the main political parties. This may include a power-sharing arrangement, or the creation of additional executive positions, a commitment to longer-term political reforms and reconciliation processes, or the repetition of the election in full or in part. In addition, the negotiations may lead to political agreements that define plans for long-term political reform processes, as well as short-term measures aimed at addressing the causes of violence. However, there is also a no-deal scenario, where the party in power will seek to silence protests through the continued use of force and delegitimize the political opposition’s claims through a public information campaign.
Phase 4
This phase is characterized by longer-term political reform and reconciliation efforts. Several commissions may be set up to ensure the full implementation of political, constitutional, administrative, and electoral reforms. There may also be reconciliation, trust-building, and truth-seeking efforts. Such activities may be delayed as a result of the unwillingness of conflict parties to commit to the agreed-upon reforms. Conflict parties may seek to retain the status quo, reverse the gains, or manipulate the content, direction, and pace of the implementation process. In addition, while power-sharing arrangements may be functioning, the new power-holders may block a genuine political reform process, which, for instance, would address the socio-economic causes of the conflict.