Scenario 2/4
This illustrative scenario describes options for digital inclusion to prevent, mitigate, and resolve electoral violence. After decades of contested elections that have at times seen violent protests, a set of controversial reforms has led to the increasing political mobilization of the population along ethnic lines. Therefore, the major political opposition party boycotts the elections. Following the elections, the governing party declares its victory. However, large-scale violent protests break out, accompanied by country-wide skirmishes among various groups. In this context, the political opposition calls for the resignation of the government and a constitutional reform process. The parties eventually agree to negotiate with the support of an international mediator.
Phase 1
The run-up of the elections sees provocations across party lines involving limited violence, for instance, during demonstrations or in the form of campaigns to boycott the elections. Politicians, political groups, or extremist movements may use media and social media for spreading rumors and ethnic scapegoating. Government or political parties may also sponsor violence. Incumbent leaders and ruling party members may employ or threaten violence against the political opposition or potential voters before, during, or after elections. At this stage, violence can also result from grievances related to controversial or failed political reform processes, such as policies related to the re-drawing of electoral boundaries, which emphasize political divisions along ethnic lines.
Phase 2
Following the elections, results will be contested, most likely by the losing party. More than one candidate or party may claim victory, and there may be allegations of electoral fraud. In the context of the contested elections, different forms of violence may break out. Spontaneous and disorganized protests can turn violent as a consequence of police or army crackdowns. Opposition politicians may be threatened, arrested or physically assaulted. Such acts may provoke more protests and more violence. In addition, organized militias may form and organize attacks against members of the other ethnic group. Civil society organizations will call for an end to violence, a peaceful resolution of the conflict, or to bring in a mediator. Third parties such as foreign governments may also call for an end to violence and increase the political pressure on the conflict parties, including through visits to the country. At the end of the phase, the leaders of the conflicting parties will eventually agree on negotiating a peaceful solution to the crisis.
Phase 3
The negotiations between the contending parties begin. This process is likely mediated by a third party, such as the head of a foreign government, an international organization, or an eminent poltical person. The negotiations are likely to start in an exclusive and possibly informal manner, with limited options for participation of other groups. Often, inclusion will increase incrementally. The negotiations will lead to a deal between the representatives of the main political parties. This may include a power-sharing arrangement, or the creation of additional executive positions, a commitment to longer-term political reforms and reconciliation processes, or the repetition of the election in full or in part. In addition, the negotiations may lead to political agreements that define plans for long-term political reform processes, as well as short-term measures aimed at addressing the causes of violence. However, there is also a no-deal scenario, where the party in power will seek to silence protests through the continued use of force and delegitimize the political opposition’s claims through a public information campaign.
Phase 4
This phase is characterized by longer-term political reform and reconciliation efforts. Several commissions may be set up to ensure the full implementation of political, constitutional, administrative, and electoral reforms. There may also be reconciliation, trust-building, and truth-seeking efforts. Such activities may be delayed as a result of the unwillingness of conflict parties to commit to the agreed-upon reforms. Conflict parties may seek to retain the status quo, reverse the gains, or manipulate the content, direction, and pace of the implementation process. In addition, while power-sharing arrangements may be functioning, the new power-holders may block a genuine political reform process, which, for instance, would address the socio-economic causes of the conflict.
Phase 1
The run-up of the elections sees provocations across party lines involving limited violence, for instance, during demonstrations or in the form of campaigns to boycott the elections. Politicians, political groups, or extremist movements may use media and social media for spreading rumors and ethnic scapegoating. Government or political parties may also sponsor violence. Incumbent leaders and ruling party members may employ or threaten violence against the political opposition or potential voters before, during, or after elections. At this stage, violence can also result from grievances related to controversial or failed political reform processes, such as policies related to the re-drawing of electoral boundaries, which emphasize political divisions along ethnic lines.
Explore the following 1 use case(s) of digital technology:
Use Case 1
This social media tool connects local level dialogue efforts that aim to prevent election violence with national-level political reform processes. The tool would be composed of two social media groups: First, a closed social media group for mediators, through which local-level mediators can regularly share the results of the dialogue processes with national-level mediators that support the political reform process. Second, a public-facing social media page would allow members of the public to share their thoughts on the reform process, for instance, through polls, stories, or comments on posted statements. The group would help to capture the qualitative content of the local-level dialogues (e.g. how citizens are thinking about a given reform process and what political changes they wish to see). This public group would include summaries from the private group, and general information about the reform process.
The tool could be used to prevent electoral violence (Phase 1), or deal with its aftermath (Phase 4).
The tool requires both the willingness and motivation of local dialogue participants to share information and inform national-level processes. The dialogue participants' digital literacy will influence the quality of inputs on the social media page. High levels of political polarization and the prevalence of hate speech may jeopardize the online dialogue efforts or require strong content moderation.
Social media
Phase 1
Phase 2
Following the elections, results will be contested, most likely by the losing party. More than one candidate or party may claim victory, and there may be allegations of electoral fraud. In the context of the contested elections, different forms of violence may break out. Spontaneous and disorganized protests can turn violent as a consequence of police or army crackdowns. Opposition politicians may be threatened, arrested or physically assaulted. Such acts may provoke more protests and more violence. In addition, organized militias may form and organize attacks against members of the other ethnic group. Civil society organizations will call for an end to violence, a peaceful resolution of the conflict, or to bring in a mediator. Third parties such as foreign governments may also call for an end to violence and increase the political pressure on the conflict parties, including through visits to the country. At the end of the phase, the leaders of the conflicting parties will eventually agree on negotiating a peaceful solution to the crisis.
Explore the following 3 use case(s) of digital technology:
Use Case 1
This analysis tool identifies key narratives about the "Other" that shape the relationship between the conflict parties, which are shared in a broad selection of digital media - including social media and news websites. Sources for the analysis tool would be curated by a mediation support actor. A network of volunteer analysts would collect relevant social media content and conduct the data analysis. If large enough amounts of data are available, machine learning tools could support the analysis of the social media content. The tool would help mediators to debunk stereotypes and to encourage conflict party representatives to foster more positive community relations at the negotiation table.
This tool requires significant digital media sources. The level of freedom of expression and freedom of the press will influence the variety of narratives shared.
Data aggregator, Natural language processing
Use Case 2
A polling system used to identify where representation lies in the run-up to negotiations. The tool would ask members of the public about what individuals and organizations best represent their interests. The results of this poll could help to determine critical actors who need to be included at the negotiation table and inform the design of the negotiation process. The polling could take place through dedicated polling apps, online forms, text messaging applications, or SMS systems. The information would be collected, classified, analyzed, and conclusions shared with mediators. It could also be shared back to the polling participants and distributed among a broader set of organizations involved in the peace process.
There would need to be some pre-existing public acceptance of the process for people to agree to contribute to a poll, and political will from negotiators to incorporate this data into the selection of representatives. The credibility of the organisation conducting the polling will be critical to its success.
Online forms, polling apps, messaging services, SMS systems
Use Case 3
A digital reporting system that allows trained voluntary civilian monitors and the general public to input any incidents on the ground. The collected data would provide up-to-date information on the security situation across the country. Individuals would be able to input through SMS, online, or through a mobile application. A public version would display general information, but would not be traceable to individual reporters. All reports would be triangulated and verified by a team of validators before being published. Members of the public who report an incident could opt to be contacted by trained civilian monitors as part of the verification process. The system should be clearly linked to a response mechanism that can deal with reported incidents.
The tool can be used in phases 2, 3 and 4.
The system will be most successful if used to complement existing sources. The effectiveness of the system depends on the responsibility and reliability of the civilian monitors. In conflict-affected areas, there may be limited availability of public digital infrastructure.
Apps, SMS systems, online dashboard
Phase 2
Phase 3
The negotiations between the contending parties begin. This process is likely mediated by a third party, such as the head of a foreign government, an international organization, or an eminent poltical person. The negotiations are likely to start in an exclusive and possibly informal manner, with limited options for participation of other groups. Often, inclusion will increase incrementally. The negotiations will lead to a deal between the representatives of the main political parties. This may include a power-sharing arrangement, or the creation of additional executive positions, a commitment to longer-term political reforms and reconciliation processes, or the repetition of the election in full or in part. In addition, the negotiations may lead to political agreements that define plans for long-term political reform processes, as well as short-term measures aimed at addressing the causes of violence. However, there is also a no-deal scenario, where the party in power will seek to silence protests through the continued use of force and delegitimize the political opposition’s claims through a public information campaign.
Explore the following 2 use case(s) of digital technology:
Use Case 1
A digital reporting system that allows trained voluntary civilian monitors and the general public to input any incidents on the ground. The collected data would provide up-to-date information on the security situation across the country. Individuals would be able to input through SMS, online, or through a mobile application. A public version would display general information, but would not be traceable to individual reporters. All reports would be triangulated and verified by a team of validators before being published. Members of the public who report an incident could opt to be contacted by trained civilian monitors as part of the verification process. The system should be clearly linked to a response mechanism that can deal with reported incidents.
The tool can be used in phases 2, 3 and 4.
The system will be most successful if used to complement existing sources. The effectiveness of the system depends on the responsibility and reliability of the civilian monitors. In conflict-affected areas, there may be limited availability of public digital infrastructure.
Apps, SMS systems, online dashboard
Use Case 2
This reporting and analysis system tracks the spread of misinformation on social media and offline. The system would combine automatic monitoring of specific keywords and accounts on social media with reports from critical informants on rumors that they are picking up. Informants could be civil society actors trusted by the mediation team. Such rumors could include false information about security incidents, such as ceasefire violations, about the negotiation process, as well as any other information that mediators consider might derail peace talks. Once a rumour relevant to the negotiations is identified, the system would analyse its factual validity, source, spread and impact on public opinion. This analysis would be used by mediation support actors to counter the rumor with targeted messaging.
The availability of suitable informants is critical to the effectiveness of the system. The system requires a reliable and fast communication infrastructure that allows for swift analysis and response. The reach of the audience for counter messages depends on their digital literacy, language diversity, and connectedness to communication infrastructures.
Apps, online forms, SMS systems, social media analysis tools
Phase 3
Phase 4
This phase is characterized by longer-term political reform and reconciliation efforts. Several commissions may be set up to ensure the full implementation of political, constitutional, administrative, and electoral reforms. There may also be reconciliation, trust-building, and truth-seeking efforts. Such activities may be delayed as a result of the unwillingness of conflict parties to commit to the agreed-upon reforms. Conflict parties may seek to retain the status quo, reverse the gains, or manipulate the content, direction, and pace of the implementation process. In addition, while power-sharing arrangements may be functioning, the new power-holders may block a genuine political reform process, which, for instance, would address the socio-economic causes of the conflict.
Explore the following 2 use case(s) of digital technology:
Use Case 1
A digital reporting system that allows trained voluntary civilian monitors and the general public to input any incidents on the ground. The collected data would provide up-to-date information on the security situation across the country. Individuals would be able to input through SMS, online, or through a mobile application. A public version would display general information, but would not be traceable to individual reporters. All reports would be triangulated and verified by a team of validators before being published. Members of the public who report an incident could opt to be contacted by trained civilian monitors as part of the verification process. The system should be clearly linked to a response mechanism that can deal with reported incidents.
The tool can be used in phases 2, 3 and 4.
The system will be most successful if used to complement existing sources. The effectiveness of the system depends on the responsibility and reliability of the civilian monitors. In conflict-affected areas, there may be limited availability of public digital infrastructure.
Apps, SMS systems, online dashboard
Use Case 2
This social media tool connects local level dialogue efforts that aim to prevent election violence with national-level political reform processes. The tool would be composed of two social media groups: First, a closed social media group for mediators, through which local-level mediators can regularly share the results of the dialogue processes with national-level mediators that support the political reform process. Second, a public-facing social media page would allow members of the public to share their thoughts on the reform process, for instance, through polls, stories, or comments on posted statements. The group would help to capture the qualitative content of the local-level dialogues (e.g. how citizens are thinking about a given reform process and what political changes they wish to see). This public group would include summaries from the private group, and general information about the reform process.
The tool could be used to prevent elecotral violence (Phase 1) or deal with its aftermath (Phase 4).
The tool requires both the willingness and motivation of local dialogue participants to share information and inform national-level processes. The dialogue participants' digital literacy will influence the quality of inputs on the social media page. High levels of political polarization and the prevalence of hate speech may jeopardize the online dialogue efforts or require strong content moderation.
Social media
Phase 4